Dr Stuart Parkinson is a Steering Group member of the UK branch of the Global Campaign on Military Spending (GCOMS-UK) and Executive Director of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR).
Summary
In the government’s 2026 Budget, the UK’s core military spending will rise to £68.3 billion in the current financial year, 2026-27 – over 10% higher than last year, a very large increase for a single year. The figures also show that more than £5bn in extra funding has been allocated to the military over the period of this parliament, 2024-2029. These rises are part of the government’s plan for military spending to climb to reach 3% of GDP by 2030, on the way to meeting the NATO spending targets of 3.5% of GDP on the armed forces, and 1.5% of GDP on other “defence- and security-related” measures, by 2035. Cuts to the budgets for foreign aid and climate action are contributing to the increases in military spending. In 2025-26, core military spending was approximately 5.7 times the size of the budget for the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, responsible for most foreign aid spending. By 2028-29, this figure will rise to 8.1.
In more depth…
The Labour government’s 2026 Budget[1] confirms the huge increases in military spending announced in the Defence Investment Plan (DIP)[2] in June. This spending is planned to reach 3% of GDP by 2030,[3] with the aim being to hit the NATO target of 3.5% of GDP spent on the armed forces by 2035, with a further 1.5% of GDP to be spent on other “defence- and security-related” measures.[4]
The Budget confirmed that, for the current financial year, 2025-26, core military expenditure[5] is planned to be £68.3bn.[6] This is a 10.3% increase over the previous year – a very large rise for a single year. This means that annual core military spending is planned to rise by £14.7bn over a five-year period – well above inflation – as shown in Tables 1a&b.
Table 1a. Annual core military spending for 2024-29 as stated in Budget 2026[7]
| £bn(current prices)[8] | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 |
| Ministry of Defence budgets | 60.2 | 61.9 | 68.3 | 72.3 | 74.9 |
Table 1b. Core military spending: headline figures for period 2024-25 to 2028-29
| Total over 5y | £337.6bn |
| Increase in annual spending over 5y | £14.7bn |
| % increase over 5y | 24% |
Comparing these figures with those in the 2025 Budget[9] shows that the Treasury has allocated an additional £5.7bn for the UK military over the five-year period, 2024-2029. Some of the funding has come from cuts to the capital budgets of civilian departments such as the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).
These increases in military spending come on top of large rises under the previous Conservative government. Over the ten years to 2025-26, the UK’s core military spending rose by 27% in real terms.[10] Indeed, the UK was the sixth largest military spender in the world in 2025[11] – and its position may rise as this additional spending is rolled out.
The increase in military spending is earmarked for numerous technology programmes especially nuclear-armed submarines, aircraft, and warheads, and autonomous systems, including armed drones and artificial intelligence.[12]
The Budget figures also demonstrate the problem of cuts to government funding for climate action and foreign aid (known as ‘Official Development Assistance’ or ODA). Annual spending by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), which is responsible for most ODA spending, is planned to fall by 16% between 2025-26 and 2028-29, while the budget for DESNZ, which funds action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, will fall by 12% over this period. Cutting these budgets to fund increased military spending has been widely condemned and was discussed in previous GCOMS-UK briefings.[13] Here we provide updated figures illustrating how the funding gap is growing by comparing the ratio of core military spending to spending by the FCDO, DESNZ and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). As shown in Table 2, core military spending will rise from 5.7 times the size of the FCDO budget for the year in 2025-26 to 8.1 times in 2028-29, with similar increases in the ratios for tackling climate change and protecting nature.
Table 2. Ratio of core military spending to departmental budgets related to overseas aid, climate change, and protecting nature
| 2025-26 | 2028-29 | |
| Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) | 5.7 | 8.1 |
| Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) | 4.7 | 6.4 |
| Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) | 8.5 | 10.3 |
With limited and uneven progress being seen in efforts to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals[14] – including action on international poverty, climate change, and nature protection – this is especially unjust.
As we have discussed before, regarding the budget for climate action, the situation is even worse than the headline figures indicate. Over one-third of the budget for DESNZ is spent on managing the radioactive waste legacy of past nuclear technology programmes[15] – a very high proportion – so is not being used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
One final point – the core figures do not include some other areas of military spending, in particular, veterans’ pensions, which are not directly related to current government policies on the armed forces. The Budget 2026 documents stated that this total will be £98bn in 2027-28[16] – about £26bn more than the core spending.
In summary, the 2026 Budget has confirmed that the government is prioritising very high levels of military spending at the expense of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable, as well as urgent action to tackle the pressing climate and nature crises.
Dr Stuart Parkinson is a member of the Steering Group of GCOMS-UK, and Executive Director of Scientists for Global Responsibility.
References
[1] HM Treasury (2026). Budget 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-2026-document [move:] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-2025-document
[2] Ministry of Defence (2026). Defence Investment Plan. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-defence-investment-plan
[3] p.8 of: HM Treasury (2026). Op. cit.
[4] NATO (2025). Defence expenditures and NATO’s 5% commitment. June. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment
[5] Core military spending is expenditure by the Ministry of Defence under its ‘resource’ and ‘capital’ budgets. It excludes certain other military budget lines as discussed in the main text.
[6] All figures in this briefing are calculated from those on pp.145-6 of HM Treasury (2026) – except where otherwise indicated.
[7] pp.145-6 of: HM Treasury (2026). Op. cit.
[8] ‘Current prices’ means that there has been no adjustment for inflation.
[9] HM Treasury (2025). Budget 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-2025-document
[10] pp.7 of: House of Commons Library (2026). UK defence spending. Research briefing. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8175/
[11] SIPRI (2026). Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025. April. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2026/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2025
[12] pp.9-12 of Ministry of Defence (2026). Op. cit.
[13] See, for example: GCOMS-UK (2025). Spring Statement reveals how huge rises in the military budget hit the most vulnerable the hardest. March. https://demilitarize.org.uk/spring-statement-reveals-how-huge-rises-in-the-military-budget-hit-the-most-vulnerable-the-hardest/
[14]United Nations Statistics Division (2025). The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2025. July.
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2025/
[15]Porritt J (2025). Ed Miliband’s nuclear nightmares. https://jonathonporritt.com/uk-nuclear-subsidies-desnz-spending/
[16]p.152 of: HM Treasury (2026). Op. cit.
